This study has the main objective of verifying the presupposition of Marchetti (2013) that the recent electoral competition that is marked by the judicialization also applies to the scope of the supplementary elections. The main hypothesis of the work is that the judicialization of municipal electoral competition has become an additional strategy used by political actors because of its effectiveness. The results indicate that approximately 58% of the Supplementary Elections that occurred in the period were motivated solely by lawsuits filed by opposition political groups. In these cases, the opposition can elect the new mayors in 62% of situations.
Introduction
Every four years, Brazil holds thousands of municipal elections that usually go without major problems. However, in many municipalities, the situation does not remain stable, and after a certain time, new elections, known as supplementary elections, are being convened. On these occasions, voters return to the polls to choose the mayor again 1 .
Usually these elections are preceded by a real judicial war, fought between opposing groups and/or Public Prosecution and the elected candidates. In this context, the role of the electoral judiciary is evident, because it is up to it to define whether the result of the polls will prevail, or whether citizens will be called 1 All the data has gone through at least one double check, since the Electoral Justice databases are not yet fully reliable. In addition to the TSE check, the data were checked against the respective Regional Courts and with newspaper reports available on the World Wide Web.
Such a measure was necessary because the repository of electoral data, which was to be the main source of information, was not complete. As an example, the supplementary elections held in the State of São Paulo in 2004 are not available in that database. Likewise, the supplementary election calendar on the TSE website only lists data until the year 2007. The composition of his party coalition was used as a criterion to position a candidate as being opposed to the previous government. If the former mayor's party was part of the coalition of the next mayor, he was treated as an ally candidate. Otherwise, it was considered as opposing. This same criterion was adopted in the alignment of the authorship of the deposition actions. If they were tried by a party or coalition of which the defendant was not part, they remained classified as opposing.
Research Design
The reasons for the deposition deserve clarification. Ineligibility was divided into two distinct moments: whether it occurred before Complementary Law 135/10 (Clean Registry Act), or whether it occurred after that law was instituted.
This measure aimed to evaluate the impact of the new legislation on the phenomenon of the judicialization of politics, since the legal regime of ineligibilities changed greatly. Kinzo's criterion (2004 Kinzo's criterion ( , 2007 was used to establish the ideological position of the parties (left, center and right), with adaptations to accommodate the recent party expansion that led to 35-the number of parties in Brazil with access to the Special Fund Campaign Financing Plan, FEFC for the 2018 Elections.
When the party was only the result of a name change or the split of another party, the ideological alignment of the original party was considered. When the party was effectively a new political actor, its most common alliances and possible positions on substantive issues were considered (Kinzo, 2007: p. 153 ).
As the origin of the decision, three possibilities were established: first, second or third instance. In this way, if the decision of rejection or cassation proceeded from the electoral judge, the first instance will be considered as the origin and so on, until the TSE, understood in this work as the third electoral body. The importance of this descriptive category stems from the need to assess how much the Courts influence the local electoral dynamics and what the role of the singular judges in this process is.
Regarding the date of the decision to cancel the plaque or the rejection of the candidature registration, the date of the first decision pronounced by a collegiate body (TRE or TSE) was chosen, either by confirming the first-degree judgment that had already determined the rejection of the registration or the plaque, or by reforming the decision that had allowed the subsequently deposed candidate to compete.
Thus, the date considered will always be that of the decision rendered by a collegiate body that gave rise to a new election. It is justified to adopt this criterion because the collegiate decision became the starting point for the determination of ineligibility based on the Clean Registry Act. In practice, it means to say that the decision that effectively "has validity" is that which is pronounced by a collegiate body. Therefore, it is observed that the sample contains almost the entire gamut of the phenomenon that one intends to study. (1993) and Ariosto Teixeira (1997) . While the former studied the Direct Unconstitutionality Actions (Adins) of the political parties between October 1988
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and February 1993, comparing them with those initiated by the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB) and the trade union confederations, the latter directed its research to the Adins proposed by the political parties, trade union confederations or national class entities and OAB, extending the period covered until 1996.
The two main conclusions pointed out by Castro (1993) are in line with what international literature has always pointed out in relation to the phenomenon of the judicialization of politics. The first conclusion is that political parties have transferred to the court an important part of the politics, utilizing the Adins as instruments for questioning the government's economic policy and aiming for a more aggressive politics from the distributive point of view (CASTRO, 1993, pp. 51-52) . The second conclusion points out that there would be an institutional vacuum capable of being filled by the innovation of constitutional rules (Castro, 1993: p. 53 ).
For Teixeira (1997) , the judicialization of politics occurs when one of the following hypotheses is verified, or both: 1) "courts or judges make or extend their participation in the decision-making process regarding the formulation and/or implementation of public policies"; or 2) "non-judicial negotiations and typically political decision-making forums are affected or begin to adopt rules and procedures in their operation and in the behavior of their operators."
The later work of Vianna et al. (1999) , sought to analyze all the 1935 Adins filed by the end of 1998 year, observing in each one the year of distribution, the applicants, the requirements, the legal provisions questioned, the constitutional justification, the judgment regarding injunctions and the merits of the action.
The authors emphasized (Vianna et al., 1999: p. 10 ) that the artificial imposition of a free market in Brazil from 1989 onwards led to a process in which parliamentary majorities imposed a new vision that ended up recovering the most anachronistic things in Brazilian politics.
Nor would the judiciary have been unscathed by the process of establishing a decision-making process (Vianna et al., 1999: pp. 11-12) , with proposals that have a binding effect on the decisions handed down at its summit, which ended up putting autonomy of the magistrates of the first degree.
The main works on the judicialization of politics usually focus on the role played by the Courts, especially the Federal Supreme Court (STF) and the TSE, in the clashes with the other powers (Arantes, 2005; Arantes & Kerche, 1999; Carvalho, 2004; Marchetti, 2004 Marchetti, , 2008 Marchetti, , 2013 Marchetti & Cortez, 2015; Oliveira, 2005; Pogrebinschi, 2012; Taylor, 2006 Taylor, , 2007 .
The focus of research in the Adins is not the only one, nor is it the best way to study the phenomenon of the expansion of the judiciary (Silva, 2004: p. 134) . It is true that the 1988 Constitution was the great catalyst for the phenomenon in Brazil (Ribeiro, 2001: p. 55 ) and affected the country's judiciary. For Barboza and Kozicki (2012) , the judicialization of politics can be studied in several aspects, and it can be said that the very idea of constitutionalism, as well as the prediction of political issues in the Constitution, would allow the judiciary to face any political issue as a constitutional issue. The authors also point out that, although it is apparently against the interests of the Parliament, it can be said that there is a consensus that the acceptance of new roles by the judiciary is being accepted by society itself, since the actors themselves would see the judiciary as an appropriate forum to address these issues. Verbicaro (2008) points out that there is a strong connection between the flo- Finally, it should be pointed out that there are authors who differentiate between judicial activism and judicialization of politics (Tassinari, 2013; Streck, 2017: p. 87 ), which is understood as a sort of corruption in the relationship between the Powers, inasmuch as there would be an extrapolation of the limits on the judiciary's action through a decision that is taken from non-legal criteria. In this work, we chose to treat judicial activism and judicialization of politics as similar terms, especially since most authors understand them.
In the following section, we will see how a byproduct of the judicialization of politics, the judicialization of electoral competition, has been treated in the Brazilian literature.
Judicialization of Electoral Competition in Brazil
This section intends to discuss the judicialization of electoral competition in Brazil, from the main national authors. Like Marchetti (2013) and Zalamena (2013), we adopt the assumption that the recent political-partisan competition is marked by the judicialization. And we do it for basically two reasons: the structure of electoral governance in Brazil, which is extremely judicialized, and the positions of the High Courts on eminently electoral issues.
The concept of electoral governance gained academic prominence from Huntington's work (1994) , which points to the emergence of concern about the credibility of electoral results in democracies born in the third democratic wave.
The concern of these new regimes would be to ensure that poll results are fair, transparent and accepted by political competitors. For Mozaffar and Schedler (2002) , electoral governance would be a comprehensive number of activities that create and maintain the vast institutional framework in which voting and electoral competition take place. It operates on three different levels: rulemaking, rule-application, and adjudication. These three functions would not be attributions of one organ only. According to the authors, the first function would be at the legislative level, the second at the administrative level and the third at the judicial level.
The Electoral Justice of Brazil is a product of the Revolution of 1930 and was inspired by the flags raised at the time: criticism of the competitive oligarchy that had settled along the first republic and the evident discredit of the electoral process, marked by coronelismo 2 (Marchetti, 2013: p. 41 ). In the Brazilian case, The electoral judges, according to Article 118, III, of the Federal Constitution are judges of law selected by the respective Regional Court. Its jurisdiction is the electoral zone, a geographical circumscription that may coincide with one or more municipalities. The Electoral Boards, finally, are temporary organs and serve only for the execution of the electoral process. Article 121 of the Federal Constitution establishes that they are composed of two or four citizens with notorious suitability, appointed by the Electoral Judge and appointed by the President of the TRE. The boards help the electoral judge perform the necessary procedures for the electoral process in each area.
As the juridical legal theory emphasizes (Gomes, 2017; Ribeiro, 1990) , electoral justice exercises administrative, jurisdictional, normative and consultative functions. In other words, it is not only responsible for organizing elections (the application of rules) and for judging electoral disputes (adjudication of rules), but also for formulating resolutions of a clearly normative nature (rulemaking), as well as providing information on concrete issues to legally legitimize inter-2 Coronelismo is a Brazilianism used to define the complex power structure that begins at the municipal level, exercised with private hypertrophy, the figure of the coronel -on the public power -the State, and having as secondary characters the electoral fraud and disorganization of public servicesand encompassed the entire political system of the country during the Brazilian Old Republic. ested parties. Thus, the way the Brazilian electoral body is structured by itself favors the judicialization of any electoral issues. After all, the executive body of the country's electoral body is made up of judges who accumulate administrative functions.
As already anticipated, the second reason we adopted the assumption of the judicialization of political-partisan competition would be the decisions of the The next decision was also made by the STF Plenary, which declared that the provisions of Law 9096/95 (Law of Political Parties) that instituted the so-called "barrier clause" were unconstitutional. The unanimous decision was taken in the joint trial of two direct actions of unconstitutionality (Adins 1351 and 1354), filed by the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB) and the Christian Socialist Party (PSC), respectively. Although the so-called barrier clause or "performance" clause did not mean the cancellation of partisan registration of parties that did not reach it, there was a direct impact on both parliamentary functioning and access to party fund resources, which in practice meant a direct threat to the political existence of small parties.
The declaration of unconstitutionality of the barrier clause had a direct im-3
The principals of annual electoral laws (also called electoral precedence) was incorporated into the Constitution in 1993, with the approval of Constitutional Amendment (EC) 4, which reworded Article 16 of the Constitution: "The law that changes the electoral process will in force on the date of its publication, and does not apply to the election that occurs up to one year from the date of its validity Parties and reduced to three cases of just cause for partisan disaffiliation: substantial change or repeated deviation from the party program; severe personal political discrimination; and a change of party made during the 30-day period preceding the membership period required by law (six months) to run for the majority or proportional election at the end of the current term of office.
arrived at the court only a month earlier. In this way, the Clean Registry Act became valid only in the 2012 elections.
According to Paranhos et al. (2014) , the studies on electoral judicialization in Brazil are quite small and do not have a comprehensive research agenda. The mentioned authors affirm that in the period between 1996 and 2013 only ten articles published in Brazil referred directly to elections, that is, those that dealt with the judicialization of the electoral system and some other subareas.
Steibel (2007) deals with the right of reply, and the concept of electoral governance is explored by Marchetti (2008) and Bitencourt (2013) . The focus of Shirado's work (2008, 2009 ) is partisan infidelity and ethics of legality in the application process. Ethics is also the focus of Canela's work (2012).
The research performed by Marchetti and Cortez (2009) suggests that TSE's judicial activism would indicate dissatisfaction with the rules of functioning of political competition in Brazil, and Pozzobon's (2009) study concludes that the Brazilian judiciary (post-democratization) has acted proactively. Zauli (2011) concludes that the mechanism of consultation with the electoral courts has allowed the advancement of electoral judicialization and is concerned with constitutional ethical issues.
Finally, the work of Costa (2013) 
Supplementary Elections
The concept of supplementary elections is drawn from Article 224 of the Electoral Code, which provides for the holding of new elections in basically two hypotheses: the first, when there is a nullity of votes that reaches more than half of the vote for the majority positions of President of the Republic, Governor or
Mayor.
The (Zalamena, 2013; Coelho, 2014; Garcia, 2016; Crespo, 2017; Moura, 2018) And An Article (Crespo & Peixoto, 2018) .
The work of Zalamena (2013) analyzes the judicialization of local political competition in the municipal elections of Rio Grande do Sul, in 2008, and carried out a case study on the supplementary elections that occurred during that period. The research concludes that the local political competition has been significantly altered by the intervention of the Electoral Justice in its majoritarian lawsuits (Zalamena, 2013: p. 123 ).
Other research that focused on the 2008 elections, however, related to the State of Piauí, was conducted by Coelho (2014) . According to the author, the ju-dicialization of the electoral process has bureaucratized political competition and displaced the central axis of the democratic process, since political actors note that they can obtain electoral gains through legal mechanisms (Coelho, 2014: p. 141 ). Garcia (2016) seeks to relate electoral and party behavior to the socioeconomic profile of the Brazilian municipalities that held additional mayoral elections between 2013 and 2015. The author points out that the new elections modify the political groups that control power (Garcia, 2016: p. 155 ).
Crespo's work (2017) also addresses the supplementary elections that took place in the country but related to the regular elections of 2012. The work suggests that those who most propose actions and electoral investigations are the losers who are harmed by irregularities in ordinary elections (Crespo, 2017: p. 112 ).
Moura (2018) Finally, Crespo and Peixoto's (2018) research is devoted to the country's supplementary elections in relation to regular 2012 elections. The authors affirm that in the supplementary elections, the voters' preference would be for the choice of candidates who had already been tried and received well, to the detriment of candidates who had not participated in the annulled suit (Crespo & Peixoto, 2018: p. 184 ).
This literature, however, presents limitations that need to be highlighted. Some works were restricted to a State of the Federation and to a specific year (Zalamena, 2013; Coelho, 2014) , while others, although they analyzed elections that occurred throughout the country, also restricted the period studied (Garcia, 2016; Crespo & Peixoto, 2018) .
The main proposal of this work, besides filling some of the existing gaps, is to reverse the logic of the study of the judicialization of electoral competition and present the role of the first instance of the Electoral Judiciary in this process.
Therefore, we assume that supplementary elections are an expression of the judicialization of politics (Zalamena, 2013) .
Judicialization of the Municipal Electoral Competition
In this section the result of the research undertaken is presented. As mentioned earlier, 433 municipal elections were held in Brazil between November 2004 and October 2018, of which only six were not motivated by lawsuits 5 . Table 1 below shows the frequency of the supplementary elections held as a basis in the years of the invalidated elections. Table 2 below shows the frequency of reasons for the occurrence of new elections. In it, it is possible to observe 11 different legal grounds for the annulment of the regular elections and the consequent deposition of the elected mayors.
As can be seen, the illicit capture of suffrage, popularly known as "vote buying," is the main reason for the occurrence of new elections (31.4%), closely followed by the ineligibility of the Clean Registry Act (24.5%). However, when all the modalities of ineligibilities (before and after the Clean Registry Act) are added, they occupy the first position, with a little more than 34% of the cases. The purchase of votes is a phenomenon widely reported in the political history of Brazil (Porto, 1989; Nicolau, 2012) and constitutes one of the facets of typical coronelismo in the interior of the country (Leal, 1975 When the reasons for the depositions are observed year after year, some facts deserve to be highlighted. The first paragraph of Article 41-A of Law 9504/97 was introduced, which makes it unnecessary to explicitly request votes to characterize the illegal conduct of vote buying.
When it is observed that the voicings were based on the vote buying for the 2008 elections, 55 cases, corresponding to 86% of the total, are found after the amendment of Article 41-A of Law 9504/97. Although it is undeniable that legal changes in the electoral scope are not applicable ex tunc, one can see the influence of the legal context in the formation of the decision-making process by the judges and courts.
The facts suggest that the historical moment was favorable to tightening the rules pertaining to voting, which would allow the judges to act more rigorously.
This could also be the reason for the sudden increase in the rejection of application records based on the Law of Ineligibilities (LC 64/90).
As mentioned in the explanation of the methodology, the ineligibilities were divided into two categories in this research: those prior to the edition of Complementary Law 135/10 (Clean Registry Act) were treated as Ineligibilities of LC 64/90; the later ones were classified in the category Clean Registry Act. In this way, the research indicates that the Ineligibilities of LC 64/90 suffered a sudden increase in 2008, like the one occurring with the vote buying.
Consistent with this inference, the ineligibilities arising from the Clean Registry Act appear in 2012 with a higher number of occurrences than those resulting from the previous regime of ineligibility. Apparently, the tightening of the law favored a more incisive position in the Judiciary in the decision.
Finally, the Itinerant Mayor, also known as Professional Mayor, deserves equal prominence, because although in absolute terms the numbers are not expressive, the comparison with the other years highlights the year 2008. The TSE always understood that the mayor reelected in a certain municipality could apply for the same position in another municipality, observing the deadlines for leave office, electoral domicile and party affiliation.
As of the 2008 elections, however, the TSE changed its orientation by judging the Special Electoral Appeal (Respe) 32507, establishing the understanding that Article 14, paragraph 5, of the Federal Constitution prohibits perpetration in the position, and it is not possible to have a subsequent third term, even if in a different municipality.
This understanding was maintained by the STF, which, on August 1, 2012, established the Extraordinary Appeal (RE 637485) by a majority of votes, a stipulation that makes the citizen who has held two consecutive terms in the municipal executive, ineligible for the position of mayor even if they are applying for a different municipality.
The intersection of motives by region of the country highlights the Northeast and Southeast regions. While the Northeast is the champion in relation to illicit capture of suffrage, the Southeast is an isolated leader in relation to the ineligibility of the Clean Registry Act. This is shown in Table 4 below.
It does not seem surprising that the Southeast and Northeast regions present the highest frequencies of supplementary elections, respectively 134 and 130 elections, since they are also the regions with the largest number of municipalities; the Northeast has 1794 and the Southeast has 1668. In the period studied, there were supplementary elections in all States of the Federation.
The state with the highest number of occurrences in absolute terms is Minas Gerais, with 63 elections, which corresponds to 14.5% of the total. However, Minas Gerais with its 853 municipalities is the state with the highest number of this type of federal entity, which means that, in proportional terms, its participation falls to the 18th position in the ranking of supplementary elections. As for the size of the municipality, it can be said that supplementary elections constitute a phenomenon typical of small towns. The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) classifies the municipalities in a scale of four segments: Small Porte I, for municipalities with up to 20,000 inhabitants; Small Porte II, for municipalities from 20,001 to 50,000; Medium Porte, for municipalities between 50,001 and 100,000; Large Porte for those with population between 100,001 and 900,000. Municipalities with more than 900,000 inhabitants are metropolises. According to this classification, just over 90% of the supplementary elections occurred in municipalities with less than 50,000 inhabitants.
The data corroborate the findings of Garcia (2016: p. 61 ), for whom, proportionally, there was a higher incidence of these disputes among the small municipalities of the country. The following Table 5 shows the reasons for the additional municipal elections by size.
In cities with less than 20,000 inhabitants, the cases of vote buying predominate. In cities with 20,001 to 50,000 inhabitants, the percentage of supplementary elections motivated by vote buying is equal to those resulting from the Law of Clean Registry Act. It can be affirmed, then, that as the size of the municipality increases, the axis of the motives of the vote buying moves towards the ineligibility of the Clean Registry Act. In medium and large municipalities, the higher percentages of supplementary elections are derived from the Clean Registry Act.
It is also noted that supplementary elections constitute a multiparty phenomenon. In all, 28 parties had mayors deposed. In relation to the ideological alignment, a predominance of right-center or right-wing parties is observed, which account for approximately 80% of the cases. The party with the largest number of depositions is the MDB, followed by the PSDB. Coincidentally, these are the parties that elected the largest number of mayors in the period 6 . There are, therefore, no great surprises, and there is correlation between the number of mayors elected by the party and the number of deposed mayors. That is, on average, the parties that most elect mayors are also the parties that have more mayors deposed.
It is also noted that the vote buying and the ineligibilities resulting from the Clean Registry Act constitute the main reasons for depositions of mayors in most parties. In the MDB, for example, the vote buying is responsible for 32% and the ineligibilities are responsible for 24%. The PSDB numbers are 32% and 25%, respectively.
Although the Brazilian academic production, in a largely majority way, has always been dedicated to the study of the courts when it intends to deal with the judicialization of the electoral competition (Marchetti, 2008 (Marchetti, , 2013 Zauli, 2011; Steibel, 2007; Bitencourt, 2013; Marchetti & Cortez, 2015; Pozzobon, 2009; Costa, 2013; Junior, 2014; Lima & Beçak, 2016; Oliveira et al., 2018) , we observe that the phenomenon of judicialization is not limited to the higher courts.
When the origin of the deposition decisions is observed, there is a clear predominance of the singular judge or first instance judges in the deposition processes. The first instance is therefore responsible for approximately 73% of all decisions leading to further elections.
In fact, the role of the first instance of the judiciary in the electoral sphere cannot be neglected. The Justice in Numbers report (CNJ, 2018) points out that the external recess index of the Electoral Court in Brazil in 2017 was 4.4%. That is, only 4% of the sentences handed down by electoral judges were appealed to the High Courts, which leads to the inference that a minimum percentage of first instance judicial decisions in the Electoral Court are subject to change.
When one observes the historical series, it is verified that even in election years the index does not exceed 20%. This is a good indication of the power of electoral judges and how their interference from the electoral game can effectively define the direction of competition.
However, except in cases of explicit judicial activism, the judicialization is a phenomenon that needs actors that lead to the judiciary to deal with. That is, the parties must bring the discussion that they wish to see judicialized to the knowledge of the judiciary. When it comes to the judicialization of electoral competition, the parties may be the Public Prosecutor's Office, candidates and coalitions, representatives of political parties, citizens and even judicial bodies, since the Electoral Court has the sui generis characteristic of performing administrative functions in parallel to the judges (Gomes, 2017 (Gomes, : p. 2409 The scenarios in which opposition parties acted as authors or coauthors of the actions cover 80% of the supplementary elections, which suggests that the parties are the main ones responsible for the judicialization of the elections that ended invalidated, either by the cassation, or by the rejection of the registration of the plaque winner. In a little more than 2% of the supplementary elections, the judiciary ordered the dismissal of the ex officio registration, in the exercise of its administrative attribution.
The case of the municipality of Água Preta/PE, in which the candidate Armando Almeida Souto of the PDT had its registration contested by allies for irregularities in the party convention, deserves record. The candidate was re-elected in the subsequent supplementary election. This was the only case in which the cassation took place on the initiative of a party allied with the elected candidate.
A natural unfolding of our working hypothesis about the high judicialization of municipal electoral competition, seen through the supplementary elections, would be the realization that prosecution is a usual strategy of political contenders. However, the question remains about the validity of this strategy.
The frequency of supplementary elections provoked by opposition groups confirms the first assertion and, in fact, judicialization seems to be an additional strategy in municipal electoral competition. After all, if a strategy does not work, it tends to be abandoned, or at least underutilized.
This makes relevant the intersection between the authorship of the actions and the political alignment of the mayors elected in the supplementary elections in relation to the deposed mayors. That is, the objective is to know if, after the accomplishment of the supplementary election, the political coalition in power was renewed.
When we observe the results of all the supplementary elections surveyed, we can see an apparent balance, with opposition political parties electing 216 mayors and the political coalition of the previous mayor choosing 217. In other words, opposition political parties manage to take power in approximately 50% of the cases. The figures are somewhat lower than those recorded by Garcia (2014: p. 155 ), who pointed out that the group winning the ordinary election would continue in the municipal government in 53.3% of the cases. However, the database of that work computed only 113 supplementary elections, referring to 112 municipalities, regarding the regular elections of 2012.
In virtually all scenarios, mayors elected in supplementary elections are mostly allies of the previous mayor. However, when the opposition is the author of the lawsuit responsible for the new election, the results are reversed, and the opposi-tion mayors win in most cases. When opposition groups act alone in deposition actions, approximately 63% of the supplementary elections that they dispute are due. Apparently, judicializing electoral competition brings benefits to opposition political parties and allows for increased chances of victory in a sort of court-ordered "third round."
Findings with Analysis
The theme of the municipal supplementary elections is still little explored in the Brazilian academy. The few existing works, such as Zalamena (2013), Coelho (2014) , Garcia (2016) and Crespo (2017) deal with the theme in a limited way in space or time.
The data collected indicate that the use of actions aimed at the deposition of mayors has become an additional strategy in electoral competition. After all, approximately 58% of the actions were moved solely by opposition parties. When the cases in which the opposition acted jointly with the Public Prosecutor's office are added to the figures, the figure reaches a staggering 80% of the cases.
There is also a balance sheet, with opposition political groups and allies of the previous mayor each winning approximately 50% of the supplementary elections analyzed. However, this is only an apparent balance, because on average, defeated political groups that judicialize the electoral process and succeed in invalidating the regular elections, obtain the power in half of the supplementary elections that they contend for. That is, the holding of new elections allowed them to reverse adverse results.
The numbers are even more significant when opposition groups act alone in deposition actions. In these cases, approximately 63% of the supplementary elections that they dispute are due. As Coelho (2014: p. 141 ) points out, "political actors note that they can obtain electoral gains through legal devices, and do not hesitate to use them". This discussion is not only of a theoretical nature, because the consequences of the judicialization are not always visible immediately. In the electoral context, the well-known slowness of the judicial apparatus, which is often recognized as necessary for the reliability of decisions, can produce the opposite effect and discredit justice.
It is hoped, therefore, that new work on the subject will emerge and that it can be included in the public debate, since elections constitute the guarantor of the legitimacy of democratic governments and no better alternative has been found in the Modern Constitutional State.
